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Abstract
The paper enriches a standard signaling model of education with issues of social distance defined
over educational achievements. More specifically it considers the effects that the presence of conformist
and status seeking individuals has on educational dynamics. Under very reasonable assumptions about
the composition of the society, the model endogenously displays a growing average level of schooling. As
education rises, signals get noisy and potentially harmful for what concerns firms’ profitability. Firms,
in order to adjust their screening process, react with an increase of their educational requirements. All
these dynamics are in line with recent trends and other stylized facts about education.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades average educational level has been constantly increasing in almost every European
country. Eurostat (2001) reports for instance that in 2001 over 75% of 25 to 29 year old had completed
at least an upper secondary education compared with 52% of people aged 50-64. Or yet (Eurostat, 2005)
that the total number of graduates in the EU25 increased by more than 30% between 1998 and 2003. The
causes that have contributed in shaping such a massive phenomenon are obviously manifold: favourable
sociopolitical situation, increasing wealth, sustained unemployment rates, rapid technological progress. In
addition to these explanations (and possibly to many others which have not been mentioned), this paper
shows that recent educational dynamics are easily accounted for by a simple signaling model (à la Spence,
1973) enriched by the presence of individuals that care about their relative position in the educational
distribution.
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There are two kinds of reasons because of which people may care about their relative level of education.
First, there are material reasons related with the chances of finding an adequate job in the labour market.
In fact, together with the increase of the general level of education, or better as a consequence to it, the
“value” of a given level of schooling has been decreasing. For instance holding a bachelor’s degree two
generations ago was really a valuable asset as well as an effective signal to send to the labour market.
Nowadays the same degree is much less informative and individuals need higher qualifications in order to
differentiate themselves.
Second, there are social and psychological reasons given that the level of education is a signal that
individuals send not only to the firms but also to the rest of the society. In many social contacts there
is in fact a favourable bias towards more educated individuals as people are usually willing to interpret
education as a proxy for respected qualities like brightness, knowledge and persistence. At the opposite,
individuals with a low level of education are often stigmatized, no matter their effective abilities. Again
this social evaluation of a given level of schooling depends on the average level in the society.1
Therefore an individual who has to decide about his level of schooling must consider not only his
absolute level but also, and possibly mainly, his relative one. This means that individuals’ preferences
about education are interdependent, a feature which is usually neglected by standard models of educational
choices. An example that clarifies how the effectiveness of this double signaling effect (towards the firms
and towards the rest of the society) is related with the average level of education is the one of a student
who gets a high grade in an important exam. The utility the student enjoys from such an achievement is
influenced by the average grade of the class. In fact, if the average is low, the signal the student sends to
the teacher is more informative and thus it is more likely to help him in his scholastic career. At the same
time the student sends a stronger signal also to his colleagues. The perception of this second component
depends on the student’s preferences. For instance his ego could be gratified or, at the opposite, the student
could feel some embarrassment in standing out so clearly.
This paper focuses on the choice about which level of education to reach, a choice that each individual
has to make considering his innate characteristics as well as his ambitions. It combines a standard model
of signaling with theories of social distance. More precisely the paper analyzes educational dynamics in a
population in which heterogeneous agents have different productivity as well as different attitudes about
their relative educational achievement. Some individuals, possibly the majority, are not influenced by
social distance considerations (independent individuals), some try to differentiate themselves and reach
a high status (status seeking individuals), some others adopt a more conformist behaviour (conformist
individuals).
The presence of non selfish agents considerably modifies standard results of static signaling models.2
In particular, under very weak assumptions about the composition of the society, the model endogenously
displays a growing level of average education. For instance education is likely to increase even in a purely
conformist society provided that the average productivity level is not too low. It is shown anyway that
1Different individuals can be more or less sensitive to social pressures of this kind. For a specific empirical evidence about
the effects that social considerations may have on educational choices see Cipollone and Rosolia (2004).
2Non selfish players are agents whose behavior is affected by the one of some other individual or reference group. See for
instance Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
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the existence of agents with interdependent preferences, though necessary in the context considered, is
not sufficient to trigger some positive educational dynamics. The model also rationalizes some other
stylized facts. In fact, as average education increases, the signals the workers send to the labour market
get less informative and potentially harmful for what concerns firms’ profitability. Therefore employers
progressively become more demanding in setting their educational requirements.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 introduces and
solves a repeated signaling game enriched with concerns about social distance. Section 4 studies the
dynamics of the average educational level in the society. Section 5 analyzes the behaviour of the firms.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
In this paper we provide an explanation for the increase in education of the last decades which is based on
the combination of a signaling model with theories of social distance and interdependent preferences. This
section briefly reviews the relevant literature in these three areas.
Increase in education. Various are the reasons that can explain the positive trend of average education
in developed countries. A first and pretty obvious explanation is that people study more because, in doing
so, they expect to get higher wages. Indeed the positive relationship between schooling and earnings is
generally confirmed (see, among many, Ashenfelter et al. (1999) or Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004))
by the estimation of Mincerian equations.3 Related to wage expectations is the literature that focuses on
the effects that skill biased technological progress had on the wage distribution (see for instance Heckman
et al., 1998). The idea is that the wage gap between unskilled and skilled workers widened considerably,
providing incentives to pursue a higher level of education.
From a social point of view the increase in education can be seen as an investment in human capital
which has beneficial effects on economic growth (Barro, 2001).4 Indeed many government policies have
been designed with the scope of raising the educational level in the society: increase and diversification of
the supply of education, subsidies and other incentives, increase of the years of compulsory schooling. On
the demand side, individuals face a trade off between studying and working and this trade off is affected by
labour market conditions. For instance in periods of high unemployment the opportunity cost of proceeding
in schooling is lower. Empirical evidences about this relationship appear in Giannelli and Monfardini (2000)
and Dellas and Sakellaris (2003).
Signaling. The concept of signaling has been introduced in the seminal paper by Spence (1973) and
rapidly became an important branch of the highly dynamic economics of information. Riley (2001) presents
a very rich overview of all the applications that signaling models found. Signaling is an attempt to solve
problems of asymmetric information. In such a situation the informed agent may have incentives to adopt
behaviours (signals) that reveal some of his unobservable characteristics to the uninformed party. In
3After Jacob Mincer who was the first one to study the relation between labor income and schooling in 1958.
4The book by Becker (1993) offers a deep analysis of the effects that education, training and on-the-job experience may
have on an individual’s human capital.
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Spence’s model the signal is the level of schooling an individual acquires. In fact education is assumed to
convey information about unobservable and innate productivity.
Signaling games often have multiple equilibria. In some of these equilibria individuals with different
characteristics send different signals (separating equilibria), in others they adopt the same behaviour such
that signals are uninformative (pooling equilibria). Various concepts of equilibrium refinements have been
proposed. The intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987, see section 3.1 for an example) emerged as the
leading one.
Social distance and interdependent preferences. Day to day life is plenty of evidences about individ-
uals’ preferences being somehow interdependent. Indeed to consider interdependent preferences means
to acknowledge that sentiments like pride, esteem, shame or acceptance do affect agents’ choices. The
investigation of these issues started with the study of individuals’ consumption patterns. In fact people
usually care not only about their absolute level of consumption but also about their relative one. Due-
senberry (1949) includes the average level of consumption into the utility function that individuals have
to maximize so that an agent increases his utility if she is able to “beat the average”. A slightly different
methodology has been followed by Pollak (1976) who models preferences that depend on other people’s
past consumption. This way agents’ behaviour is not strategic and the model becomes analytically more
tractable. From a more theoretical point of view the incentives that move status seeking individuals were
first described in Frank (1985). Robson (1992) considers the situation in which people are interested in
the ordinal rank they occupy in the distribution of wealth while Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) study the
case in which utility is affected by the amount of general consumption as well as by the consumption of a
particular good which defines the status.
When preferences are defined over the relative amount of consumption or wealth, it is natural to assume
a tendency towards a status seeking behaviour. Still, in other contexts, a more conformist attitude can
be the rule rather than the exception. The classic work about conformism is Jones (1984) who studies
examples of social influences in a college environment, in the army and in the workplace. Focusing on
the last example, Jones analyses the effort workers decide to exert. Given that extreme behaviours are
stigmatized, slowest (fastest) members of the working group feel the pressure to speed up (slow down).
Moreover new workers imitate the behaviour of older colleagues. Evidences of these kinds of peer pressures
come also from experiments (Falk and Ichino, 2003) while a more theoretical analysis of this tendency
towards conformism is given by Bernheim (1994).
To sum up both status seeking and conformist individuals care about the social distance between
them and some reference group. Because of this fact, externalities arise in both cases and thus the social
efficiency of the final outcome is not ensured. Using simple formulations of utility functions, Akerlof (1997)
shows that status seeking behaviour usually leads to overindulge in the status-producing activity (ex. over
consumption).5 The outcome deriving from conformist behaviour can instead range from underprovision
to overprovision.
5 In an older paper, Akerlof (1976) describes the so called rat-race mechanism. The probability of winning a prize increases
with the effort the agent exerts; given that everyone tries to beat the others this mechanism leads to an overprovision of effort.
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3 The model
3.1 A basic signaling model
Consider a population of potential workers.6 A proportion αh ∈ (0, 1) is characterized by a high produc-
tivity (θh = 2) while the remaining part (αl = 1− αh) has a low productivity (θl = 1). At least two firms
compete in order to hire them. These firms are not able to distinguish between the two categories given
workers’ observable characteristics. Then, if no signals were available, firms would offer a wage equal to
the average productivity w¯ = θ¯ = 2αh + αl, with w¯ ∈ (1, 2). A more efficient outcome can be achieved
through signaling.
Assume that firms have some beliefs about workers’ productivity, i.e. they think that there exists a
certain level of education e˜, such that, if worker i acquires a level of education ei ≥ e˜, then the candidate
must be highly productive. On the other side if ei < e˜ then it must be the case that the individual has a
low productivity. Given these beliefs and the specific costs of education (high types have a cost which is
half of the cost of low types), the utility functions of the workers take the following form:
Uh(e) = 2−
1
2
e2 Ul(e) = 1− e2
Optimal educational levels have to be found subject to two incentive compatibility constraints which
require high productivity individuals not to have any incentive in pretending to be low productivity types
and vice-versa:
2− 1
2
e˜2 ≥ 1 1 ≥ 2− e˜2
The constraints are satisfied by e˜ ∈
£
1,
√
2
¤
. With any of these levels of education, different types of
agents choose different levels of education (we restrict our attention to separating equilibria). In particular
low productivity workers choose el = 0 and high productivity workers choose eh = e˜. Among all these
perfect Bayesian equilibria, the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) selects the least cost separating
equilibrium: low productivity workers get the minimum level of education (e∗l = 0) while high productivity
workers choose e∗h = 1. This is the lowest possible level of education which cannot be profitably mimicked
by low types. It follows that the average level of education in the society is given by e¯ = αh.
3.2 A richer framework: signaling and social distance
Spence’s signaling game covers only one period of time, i.e. it models the choices of a single generation
of workers. Therefore its results are essentially static. Results remain static even considering a repeated
version of the game (subsequent cohorts of workers facing the one shot signaling game). In fact, assuming
average productivity to be equal among different generations, average education would remain constant
6The model is almost identical to the one presented by Spence (1973) and it provides the starting point for the analysis in
the next sections.
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over time at the level e¯t = αh. In the standard model, firms’ beliefs match workers’ actual productivity
such that neither workers nor firms have any incentive to modify their strategies.7
We study a richer framework that may display some dynamics. In our game two subsequent cohorts
participate in a signaling game. Every cohort is formed by many individuals and every individual is
characterized by a certain level of productivity and by some social preferences. Both the productivity level
and the social preferences are assumed to be innate and fixed. In fact, prior to any decision of any players,
two simultaneous moves of Nature determine the composition of each cohort. As in the standard model
agents are split into two classes according to the (low or high) productivity. The other move of Nature
defines the social preferences with respect to the average education in the society: some individuals, possibly
the majority, simply do not have social preferences (lower index i, for independent) and they are therefore
analogous to the agents in Spence’s model, some are characterized by a conformist behaviour (lower index
c), some others are status seeking (lower index s).
Each cohort of potential workers, whose size is normalized to 1, is thus partitioned as shown in Table
1. Obviously αkj ∈ [0, 1] for any k ∈ {i, c, s} and any j ∈ {l, h} and
P
k
P
j αkj = 1. The two cohorts are
identical (same size and same αkj). Therefore any movement in average education will be endogenously
created by the model and it will not be due to population growth, changes in the productivity level or in
the social preferences of the agents.
low productivity (l) high productivity (h)
independent (i) αil αih
conformist (c) αcl αch
status seeking (s) αsl αsh
Table 1: the composition of each cohort of individuals.
Once that Nature has moved the following happens:
• t = 1: the first cohort of workers plays the signaling game.
• t = 2: the second cohort of workers plays the signaling game.
We are interested in studying the dynamics of the average level of education. We indicate with e¯t the
weighted average of the levels of education chosen by each class at time t.
e¯t =
P
k
P
j αkje
t
kj k ∈ {i, c, s} , j ∈ {l, h}
Before introducing the utility functions that characterize each class of individuals and whose maximiza-
tion will lead to the optimal etkj, we discuss two assumptions that underpin the analysis of this two stages
game.
7 Indeed the original paper postulates these self-confirming beliefs of the firms exactly to avoid studying a non stationary
system (cfr. Spence, 1973, pp. 360).
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1) Players that in t ∈ {1, 2} care about their relative educational position (i.e. conformist and status
seeking individuals) are influenced by e¯t−1, the average level of education that emerged in period t− 1. In
other words players are myopic.
Non selfish individuals consider the current average educational level and not the one that will arise
at the time they will enter in the labour market.8 Such an unsophisticated behaviour seems to be very
common and a similar approach is usual in the literature (see for instance Pollak, 1976 and Jones, 1984).
In the context of our model this means that social preferences do not play any role in t = 1 (because
there is not an average level e¯0) while they matter in t = 2 where agents’ behaviour is influenced by the
realization of e¯1. Indeed the game in the first period exactly resembles a standard signaling model and it
just provides a starting point upon which the model develops in t = 2.
2) Firms maintain the same hiring strategy throughout the game.
Firms offer a wage w = 1 to any individual whose educational level is such that 0 ≤ e∗ < 1 while they
offer w = 2 to all those agents with e∗ ≥ 1. This policy ensures a perfectly effective screening process in
t = 1 (standard signaling game) and firms stick to it also in t = 2. Firms are not forward looking and they
may be surprised if individuals in t = 2 behave differently with respect to their predecessors.
The fact that both the workers and the firms are myopic makes the analysis that follows depart from a
standard rational one. Still it can be shown that the alternative assumption of workers and firms having
perfect foresight would actually amplify the movements in the average level of education.
3.3 Time t = 1
In the first period individuals’ choices are not influenced by social preferences because there is not a current
average level of education to which to compare. This stage is analogous to the standard signaling model
presented in Section 3.1. Therefore low productivity workers get a level of education equal to 0, while high
productivity individuals choose a level of 1. Optimal levels of education are thus e∗il = e
∗
cl = e
∗
sl = 0 and
e∗ih = e
∗
ch = e
∗
sh = 1. The average at the end of t = 1 is e¯1 = αih + αch + αsh =
P
k αkh.
3.4 Time t = 2
At the beginning of the second period a new cohort of potential workers faces its educational choice. The
choices of non selfish players are now influenced by their specific social preferences. Table 2 reports the
utility functions of the six categories of agents (subscripts are omitted whenever unnecessary). The wage
level is left in the implicit form w and it will be determined in accordance with the individual’s optimal
educational choice and with the hiring policy of the firms.
8Still this can be a good proxy. For instance an individual considering the idea of enrolling in a one year master may
use the current average level of education for evaluating his future relative position. Another, more practical, consideration
is based on how people get informed about the available educational choices. Usual sources of information are provided by
comments of older friends and by the reading of student guides and statistics about the likelihood of getting a job with a
certain degree. All these information describe the current situation not the future one.
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low productivity high productivity
independent Uil = w − e2 Uih = w − 12e2
conformist Ucl = w − e2 − (e− e¯1)2 Uch = w − 12e2 − (e− e¯1)2
status seekers
©Usl=w−e2−2(e−e¯1)2 if e<e¯1
Usl=w−e2+2e¯1(e−e¯1)− 12 if e≥e¯1
©Ush=w− 12 e2−2(e−e¯1)2 if e<e¯1
Ush=w− 12e2+2e¯1(e−e¯1)−
1
2 if e≥e¯1
Table 2: utility functions of the six classes of individuals.
Independent players are characterized by standard utility functions à la Spence. Utility functions for
the players with interdependent preferences are slightly more complex. Beside the part which captures the
trade off between wage and cost of education there is an extra term that models the social preferences.
In accordance with many classical contributions in the field (see for instance Pollak, 1976, Jones, 1984,
Bernheim, 1994, Akerlof, 1997) this last term enters additively in the utility functions. For the reasons
which have been explained before (assumption 1), this social component is a function of e¯1, the average
level of education that emerged in the first period. In line with the utility functions presented in Spence’s
original article (1973), this additional part appears as an explicit function which is as simple as possible.
Conformist individuals have a preference for being close to the average. The social term in the utility
function assigns an increasing cost whenever their level of education differs from the average level e¯1. The
utility functions of status seeking individuals are more problematic. A differentiation has to be drawn
between two cases. If the level of education is below e¯1 then status ambitions are frustrated. In this case
the utility function resembles the one of conformist individuals but with a higher cost for falling behind.
If, on the contrary, the educational level is above e¯1, then individual’s utility is increasing in this distance.
In this second case the function has to be corrected in some way. Consider for example the sh-class. The
natural formulation for the case e > e¯1 would be Ush = w − 12e2 + (e − e¯1)2. However this is a convex
function with no internal maximum. To have a meaningful solution the utility function takes the form
presented in Table 2.
From the analysis of Section 3.1, we already know the optimal choices of individuals with independent
preferences. In particular e∗il = 0 (such that wil = 1) and e
∗
ih = 1 (wih = 2). The following subsections are
devoted to a more specific analysis of the behaviour of each of the last four classes. After having found
optimal choices it will be possible to analyze educational dynamics between the two periods.
3.4.1 The “conformist + low productivity” class (cl)
Individuals belonging to this class face the problem max
e
Ucl where
Ucl(e) = w − e2 − (e− e¯1)2
which has solution eˆcl = 12 e¯1. Since e¯1 ∈ [0, 1] it follows that eˆcl ∈
£
0, 12
¤
confirming that agents of this
category get the low wage w = 1. Firms are in fact able to correctly categorize them as low productivity
workers. Is it always optimal for an individual belonging to this class to choose eˆcl? To answer this
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question the utility the agent gets choosing eˆcl (function A) is compared with the utility stemming from
some alternative educational levels.
A) Ucl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
= 1− 12 (e¯1)
2 C) Ucl (1) = − (e¯1)2 + 2e¯1
B) Ucl (0) = 1− (e¯1)2 D) Ucl
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
= 1− 59 (e¯1)
2
Functions B) and C) consider the choices which were made by players of the previous cohort. Function
D) depicts the utility a cl-player would get if he mimics agents belonging to the “conformist + high
productivity” class.9 The following figures provide a graphical analysis of the situation.
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Fig. 1.b: Education of the cl−class.
Figure 1.a plots the utility functions for e¯1 ∈ [0, 1]. From the upper contour set of these functions, the
optimal level of education e∗cl as a function of e¯1 can be easily derived (Fig. 1.b). Up to a critical value of
e¯1 (∼= 0.586), the optimal choice for a cl-individual is to get a level of education equal to half of the average
level. If, at the opposite, the average level of education in t = 1 is greater than the critical value, then it
is more convenient to “jump” to e∗cl = 1. The intuition for such a behaviour is clear. In fact, as far as the
average level is low, a cl-agent can conform to it without investing too much in costly education. At the
opposite if e¯1 is high enough it is then better to choose e∗cl = 1. In doing so the worker could be farther
away from e¯1 than playing the previous strategy.10 Still, sending the signal e∗cl = 1, the worker is able to
make firms believe that he is highly productive such that he will be offered the high wage w = 2.
3.4.2 The “conformist + high productivity” class (ch)
Every worker belonging to this class has to solve max
e
Uch where:
Uch(e) = w − 12e2 − (e− e¯1)2
9The optimal level for the ch-class is solved in the next subsection.
10Consider the case in which e¯1 = 0.6. Choosing ecl =
1
2
e¯1 the distance from the average would be equal to 0.3; choosing
ecl = 1 the distance is larger being equal to 0.4.
9
The solution is eˆch = 23 e¯1 so that eˆch ∈
£
0, 23
¤
. Here a problem of effectiveness of the signal arises.
Firms believe these workers to be little productive and they offer them the low wage w = 1. As in the
previous subsection, the utility a worker enjoys from choosing eˆch is compared with the utility he would
get choosing some other particular levels of education.
A) Uch
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
= 1− 13 (e¯1)
2 C) Uch (0) = 1− (e¯1)2
B) Uch (1) = 12 − (e¯1)
2
+ 2e¯1 D) Uch
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
= 1− 38 (e¯1)
2
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Fig. 2.a: Utility of the ch−class.
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Fig. 2.b: Education of the ch−class.
Figures 2.a and 2.b show that the optimal strategy is to maintain a level of education e∗ch = 1 as far as
the average level in t = 1 is not too low (the critical value is e¯1 ∼= 0.275). In doing so a worker effectively
signals his productivity and gets the high wage. Below the critical value it is instead more convenient to
choose e∗ch =
2
3 e¯1. When the average is very low the pressures to conform are stronger than the incentives
to signal the real productivity. Notice that there are no incentives in mimicking the behaviour of the
cl-class given that curve D) is below some other curves for any e¯1 6= 0. Still it could be the case that the
cl-class and the ch-class are pooled together at a level e∗ = 1.
3.4.3 The “status seeking + low productivity” class (sl)
The analysis of the behaviour of agents with status seeking preferences is more complex given the fact that
two different utility functions have to be considered. If the agent’s optimal choice is below e¯1 then max
e
Usl
has to be solved with:
Usl(e) = w − e2 − 2(e− e¯1)2 if e < e¯1
which has solution eˆsl = 23 e¯1. Given that eˆsl < e¯1 the solution can be accepted. With such a choice
(eˆsl < 1) the worker receives the low wage w = 1. If, on the contrary, the optimal choice is greater or equal
than e¯1 then the problem is max
e
Usl with :
Usl(e) = w − e2 + 2e¯1(e− e¯1)− 12 if e ≥ e¯1
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It is easy to see the positive effect of an increasing distance (e− e¯1). This effect is amplified if the average
level in t = 1 was high. Still status concerns provide a positive additional utility only if 2e¯1(e− e¯1) > 12 , i.e.
only if the agent is able to reach a certain degree of differentiation with respect to the rest of the society.
The maximization problem has solution eˆsl = e¯1. The comparison among different choices is depicted in
Figure 3.a. Figure 3.b shows the optimal level of education for a generic sl-player.
A) Usl
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
= 1− 23 (e¯1)
2 C) Usl (0) = 1− 2 (e¯1)2
B) Usl (e¯1) = 12 − (e¯1)
2 D) Usl (1) = 12 − 2 (e¯1)
2
+ 2e¯1
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Fig. 3.a: Utility of the sl−class.
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Fig. 3.b: Education of the sl−class.
In comparison with the cl-class, the sl-class follows e¯1 in a closer way (23 e¯1 vs.
1
2 e¯1) when average
education is low and it jumps before to the value e∗sl = 1 (the critical value at which this happens is
approximately equal to 0.317).
3.4.4 The “status seeking + high productivity” class (sh)
The last class of individuals is characterized by utility functions:
Ush(e) = w − 12e2 − 2(e− e¯1)2 if e < e¯1
Ush(e) = w − 12e2 + 2e¯1 (e− e¯1)−
1
2 if e ≥ e¯1
The maximization of the first function leads to eˆsh = 45 e¯1 which verifies the condition but it leads to
the low wage w = 1. The second function has solution eˆsh = 2e¯1 which can also be accepted. Now, as
far as e¯1 ≥ 12 , players receive the high wage w = 2. If, on the other hand, e¯1 <
1
2 , players get a level of
education eˆsh < 1, they do not signal their real productivity and firms offer them the low wage. Figures
4.a and 4.b illustrate peculiar utility functions and the optimal choice e∗sh.
A) Ush
¡
4
5 e¯1
¢
= 1− 25 (e¯1)
2 D) Ush (1) = 1− 2 (e¯1)2 + 2e¯1
B) Ush (2e¯1) = 32 with e¯1 ≥
1
2 E) Ush (0) = 1− 2 (e¯1)
2
C) Ush (2e¯1) = 12 with e¯1 <
1
2
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Fig. 4.a: Utility of the sh−class.
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Fig. 4.b: Education of the sh−class.
As far as e¯1 ≤ 0.5 it is optimal for a sh-player to keep a level of education e∗sh = 1. In this case the
distance between his choice and the average level is high enough to satisfy his status aspirations. On the
contrary, if e¯1 > 0.5, it is then better to choose e∗sh = 2e¯1. In this second case a sh-player realizes that his
status is menaced and he chooses a higher level of education in order to keep the distance from the rest of
the society.
4 Education dynamics
Having solved for the optimal behaviour of the six classes of agents it is now possible to focus on e¯2, the
average level of education at time t = 2. The following table summarizes the behaviour of the six classes
of individuals. We use the letter λ to indicate the critical value at which players’ optimal choices present
discontinuities.
class prop. product. θ e∗1 e
∗
2 for e¯1 ≤ λ e∗2 for e¯1 > λ λ
il αil 1 0 0 0 −
ih αih 2 1 1 1 −
cl αcl 1 0 12 e¯1 1 0.586
ch αch 2 1 23 e¯1 1 0.275
sl αsl 1 0 23 e¯1 1 0.317
sh αsh 2 1 1 2e¯1 0.500
Table 3: optimal choices at t = 1 and at t = 2.
At any period of time the average level of education is given by e¯t =
P
k
P
j αkje
t
kj for k ∈ {i, c, s} and
j ∈ {l, h} such that in t = 1 we had e¯1 = αih + αch + αsh.
Notice that the two cohorts of players with independent preferences are characterized by a constant
level of education. In fact e∗il = 0 and e
∗
ih = 1 in both periods. The model therefore predicts average
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education to remain constant in a society in which no player is influenced by issues of social distance in
educational achievements.11 Indeed average education can change only if the optimal choices of the four
classes with interdependent preferences do differ in different periods.
Proposition 1 If αil + αih = 1 then e¯2 = e¯1 = αih. The presence of individuals with interdependent
preferences is a necessary condition to observe a non constant average level of education.
The average level of education in t = 2 is a weighted average of the six classes’ optimal choices. These
choices are functions of e¯1. Moreover e¯1 is a function of the αkj , the proportions of the different classes. It
follows that e¯2 is a discontinuous function of the αkj . More precisely the function for e¯2 takes the following
form:
e¯2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
+ αsl
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
+ αsh 0.000 ≤ e¯1 ≤ 0.275
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch + αsl
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
+ αsh 0.275 < e¯1 ≤ 0.317
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch + αsl + αsh 0.317 < e¯1 ≤ 0.500
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch + αsl + αsh (2e¯1) 0.500 < e¯1 ≤ 0.586
αih + αcl + αch + αsl + αsh (2e¯1) 0.586 < e¯1 ≤ 1.000
The study of this function in its general form is not viable because it involves too many unknowns.
Therefore we focus on some special cases that still are useful in understanding the effects that social
preferences have on educational dynamics. In particular we study the cases of populations made by
the two classes of individuals with independent preferences (that possibly cover the vast majority of the
population) and by certain combinations of classes characterized by interdependent preferences. Our main
interest lies in studying how average education changes between the first and the second period. Still a
flavour of longer term dynamics (t > 2) is given by the study of the function e¯t (e¯t−1) which is assumed to
mimic the function e¯2 (e¯1).
1) Subpopulation with homogeneous social preferences
1.a) Independent and conformist individuals
A society with independent and conformist individuals implies the restrictions αil+αih+αcl+αch = 1
and e¯1 = αih + αch. The function e¯2 (e¯1) and, most importantly, the difference in the average educational
levels between the two periods (∆e¯ = e¯2 − e¯1) are:
e¯2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch
αih + αcl + αch
∆e¯ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αch
¡
2
3 e¯1 − 1
¢
αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
αcl
0.000 ≤ e¯1 ≤ 0.275
0.275 < e¯1 ≤ 0.586
0.586 < e¯1 ≤ 1.000
In line with Prop. 1 the change in average education (∆e¯) is solely a function of the proportions of
conformist individuals. Whenever αcl > 0, then average education increases from t = 1 to t = 2 (though
11This would be the case of a standard signaling game repeated over time.
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with different speed) provided that e¯1 > 0.275. In other words at least 27.5% of the population has to
be characterized by a high level of productivity. Education is therefore likely to grow even in a society in
which there are just independent and conformist individuals.
Proposition 2 If αil +αih +αcl +αch = 1 and e¯1 > 0.275 then e¯2 > e¯1. Therefore the presence of status
seeking individuals is not necessary to observe education growing over time.
If e¯1 ≤ 0.275, then average education could move in both directions depending on the specific composi-
tion of the cohorts. Consider for instance the case of αil = 0.5, αih = 0.2, αcl = 0.25 and αch = 0.05 such
that e¯1 = 0.25. Optimal choices in t = 2 are e∗il = 0, e
∗
ih = 1, e
∗
cl = 0.125 and e
∗
ch = 0.166 and they imply
e¯2 = 0.239, i.e. average education decreased. Vice versa a different composition of the society that still has
the same average level e¯1 = 0.25 could display a growing level of education. For instance with αil = 0.3,
αih = 0.2, αcl = 0.45 and αch = 0.05 we would have e¯2 = 0.264 and thus a positive ∆e¯.
Obviously for any e¯1 ∈ (0, 0.275) there exists a specific relationship between the two proportions of
conformist players such that education remains constant over time. This relation is found setting ∆e¯ = 0
such that α˜cl = γα˜ch where γ =
1− 23 e¯1
1
2 e¯1
and γ > 1, for any e¯1 ∈ (0, 0.275). Proportions of the kind α˜cl and
α˜ch define a stationary outcome of the game.
Proposition 3 For certain intervals of e¯1 and for appropriate values of the αkj, interior steady state
levels such that e¯t ∈ (0, 1) and e¯t = e¯t−1 for any t > 1 exist. Therefore the presence of individuals with
interdependent preferences is not sufficient to observe a non constant average level of education.
These interior outcomes are not stable. In fact any αcl > α˜cl implies e¯2 > e¯1 and, allowing for
new cohorts education keeps increasing so to eventually reach the (stationary and stable) outcome at
e¯t = αcl+αch+αih. We used the terminology “outcome” instead of “equilibrium” to define these situations.
In fact we still did not analyze the behaviour of the other category of players involved in the game, i.e. the
firms. Section 5 will elaborate more on this point.
To analyze the properties of these outcomes we need the following definition:
Definition 4 An outcome of the signaling game is called:
- perfectly separating if e∗kl 6= e∗yh for any k ∈ {i, c, s} and any y ∈ {i, c, s}.
- partly separating if e∗kl = e
∗
yh for some k ∈ {i, c, s} and some y ∈ {i, c, s}.
In a perfectly separating outcome (like the equilibrium of the game in t = 1) players with different
productivity send different signals, i.e. they choose different levels of education. This is not the case of the
stationary and stable outcome mentioned above (such that e¯t = αcl + αch + αih) which is indeed partly
separating. In fact conformist individuals with low productivity choose e∗cl = 1, the same signal which is
sent by the high productivity classes (ih and ch).12 Partly separating outcomes easily arise in populations
where conformist and/or status seeking individuals are present.
12Similarly if αcl < α˜cl then e¯2 < e¯1 and education approaches its minimum at e¯t = αih. This is a stable outcome which
is also partly separating given that ch-individuals fail to signal their real productivity.
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Proposition 5 The presence of agents with interdependent preferences (αil + αih < 1) can turn perfectly
separating outcomes in partly separating ones.
Section 5 analyses the effects that the dynamics described by Proposition 5 can have on the hiring
policies of the firms.
1.b) Independent and status seeking individuals
Such a restriction implies αil + αih + αsl + αsh = 1 and e¯1 = αih + αsh. The function e¯2 (e¯1) and the
relative change in the average educational level are given by:
e¯2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
αih + αsl
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
+ αsh
αih + αsl + αsh
αih + αsl + αsh (2e¯1)
∆e¯ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
αsl
¡
2
3 e¯1
¢
αsh
αsh (2e¯1 − 1)
0.000 ≤ e¯1 ≤ 0.317
0.317 < e¯1 ≤ 0.500
0.500 < e¯1 ≤ 1.000
The change in education between the two periods is never negative and ∆e¯ can be equal to zero only
if αsl = 0 or αsh = 0.
Proposition 6 If αil + αih + αsl + αsh = 1 then e¯2 ≥ e¯1. Education cannot decrease in a society with no
conformist individuals.
If αsl > 0 and αsh > 0 then education grows and it will reach the unique stationary outcome at the
maximum level e¯t = αih + αsl + 2αsh. As expected, the rat race effect among ambitious agents pushes
average education up. Even in this case, and in line with Proposition 5, the signal that agents send can
be misleading. In fact status seeking agents with low productivity can be pooled together with highly
productive workers.
2) Conformist, low productivity + status seeking, high productivity
This case captures the situation in which agents’ social preferences are correlated with their innate
productivity. Low type individuals learn that they cannot shine and they develop a taste for conformism.
High type individuals realize they have the talent and the potential to be above the average and thus they
adopt a status seeking behaviour. If this is the case then αil + αih + αcl + αsh = 1 and e¯1 = αih + αsh.
The function for e¯2 can then be formalized as:
e¯2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αsh
αih + αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αsh (2e¯1)
αih + αcl + αsh (2e¯1)
∆e¯ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
αcl
¡
1
2 e¯1
¢
+ αsh (2e¯1 − 1)
αcl + αsh (2e¯1 − 1)
0.000 ≤ e¯1 ≤ 0.500
0.500 < e¯1 ≤ 0.586
0.586 < e¯1 ≤ 1.000
Education grows over time given that ∆e¯ is positive. For low levels of e¯1, the growth is driven by
individuals of the cl-class that try not to fall too behind. Then growth in education becomes even faster
given that also status seeking individuals, feeling their status menaced, reach higher levels of schooling.
Many outcomes are partly separating because cl-individuals are indistinguishable from ih-individuals for
any e¯1 > 0.586. Still the cl and sh are never pooled together.
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3) The general case
When all the six classes of agents are present (the two with independent preferences and the four with
interdependent ones) only a qualitative solution is possible. Consider first the uniform distribution defined
by αkj = 16 with k ∈ {i, c, s} and j ∈ {l, h} such that e¯1 = αih + αch + αsh = 0.5. Optimal choices
in t = 2 are e∗il = 0, e
∗
ih = 1, e
∗
cl = 0.25, e
∗
ch = 1, e
∗
sl = 1 and e
∗
sh = 1 which imply e¯2 = 0.71 and
thus an important increase in education. Given this example, it is easy to forecast that, under very weak
assumptions regarding the αkj , average education increases over time. In fact, in order to have the opposite
result, namely a decreasing level of education, the composition of the society has to be strongly biased
towards low productive workers (e¯1 < 0.275 is a necessary condition for average education to decrease) and,
on top of that, the majority of individuals characterized by high productivity has to follow a conformist
behaviour.
As a numerical example consider the case in which αil = 0.6, αih = 0.05, αcl = 0.1, αch = 0.15,
αsl = 0.05, αsh = 0.05. The resulting average education at time t = 1 will be e¯1 = 0.25. Optimal choices
at t = 2 are e∗il = 0, e
∗
ih = 1, e
∗
cl = 0.125, e
∗
ch = 0.166, e
∗
sl = 0.166 and e
∗
sh = 1 so that e¯2 = 0.146, with
e¯2 < e¯1.
4.1 Summary
The analysis of the previous sections highlighted the effects that interdependent preferences can have
on educational dynamics. In particular it showed that the presence of individuals that care about their
relative position in the educational distribution is necessary but not sufficient for observing an average level
of education that evolves over time. Indeed it is the combination of social preferences and productivity
levels that triggers the dynamics. The assumptions needed for the model to display a growing level of
education are not particularly challenging. For instance average education is likely to increase also in a
society in which, aside to standard agents with independent preferences, there are just a few conformist
individuals. Therefore the presence of status seeking individuals is not necessary, even though it can surely
contribute.
5 Firms’ behaviour
The previous section focused on the change in average education between t = 1 and t = 2. A key assumption
that we adopted is that firms do not modify their hiring strategy. This hiring strategy is based on firms’
initial beliefs which are confirmed by individuals’ behaviour in t = 1. But then firms fail to anticipate
agents’ behaviour in t = 2. In fact they keep on offering the high wage to any worker with e∗ ≥ 1 and the
low wage to any worker with e∗ < 1. Even if a formal discussion of a longer game is outside the scope of
the paper, it is easy to understand that this assumption would become more and more restrictive as new
cohorts of workers enter in the labour market. This is so because firms’ beliefs may easily happen to be
incorrect for t > 1. Indeed this is already evident in t = 2.
The model showed in fact that partly separating outcomes easily arise such that workers with different
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productivity acquire the same educational level. In these situations signals become less informative as they
are no more perfectly correlated with workers’ productivity. In fact, from the firms’ point of view, agents
with the same e∗ are ex-ante indistinguishable. Therefore firms are not able to properly screen the workers.
Table 3 shows that, already in the second period, signals are precise and firms’ beliefs are correct only in
a short internal interval.
Interval of e¯1 Classes pooled together Firms’ beliefs Effects on profits
[0.000, 0.275] ch, sl at e∗ = 23 e¯1 , ih, sh at e
∗ = 1 incorrect positive
(0.275, 0.317] ih, ch, sh at e∗ = 1 correct null
(0.317, 0.500] ih, ch, sl, sh at e∗ = 1 incorrect negative
(0.500, 0.586] ih, ch, sl at e∗ = 1 incorrect negative
(0.586, 1.000] ih, cl, ch, sl at e∗ = 1 incorrect more negative
Table 3: consequences on firms’ profits in t = 2.
The last column of Table 3 focuses on the relation between firms’ beliefs and firms’ profitability.13 In
particular it shows that when beliefs are incorrect then profits are negatively affected in the vast majority of
cases. For very low levels of e¯1 (first row) firms actually gain because they pay the low wage to conformist
individuals with high productivity (wch < θch). But if e¯1 > 0.317 then firms are overpaying some low
productivity worker. In fact wsl > θsl in the interval (0.317, 0.586] and both wcl > θcl and wsl > θsl in the
interval (0.586, 1.000]. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 7 For high levels of e¯t firms are more likely to be disappointed by workers’ actual productivity.
Proposition 7 is in line with the initial intuition of the paper. The average level e¯t is low when just a
few individuals have a high level of education. Then these few agents stand out clearly and they send a
very effective signal to employers. At the opposite a high e¯t indicates that a considerable fraction of the
population has reached high levels of schooling. In this case signals get less informative and potentially
harmful for what concerns firms’ profitability.
Still employers learn workers’ real productivity on the workplace and they realize if their screening
process is inaccurate. If this is the case then firms will eventually change their hiring strategy. In particular,
as average education grows, they will increase the minimum level of education they believe to be effective
in discriminating between workers with different productivity. Such a behaviour seems to be consistent
with various anecdotic evidences. For instance minimum educational levels required to get certain jobs
have been increasing in the last decades, both in the public and in the private sector.
The fact that firms increase the discriminating level will affect the choices of subsequent cohorts of
individuals. Because of economic incentives and social distance considerations, different categories of
workers will progressively acquire this new higher level of education which over time will again lose its
13Firms break even whenever the wage they pay equals the real productivity of the workers. If firms pay higher wages they
incur into losses.
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separating power. According to this argument workers and firms are involved in a strategic interaction in
which both reaction functions are positively sloped such that an escalation in the level of education takes
place. A mechanism of this kind is likely to have contributed to the rise of average education in Europe.
6 Concluding remarks
The dynamics implied by the combination of theories of signaling and social distance can help explaining the
educational trends of the last decades. In fact, under very reasonable assumptions about the composition
of the society, the model endogenously displays an increasing average level of schooling. For instance
the presence of status seeking individuals is not a necessary condition and education can easily grow
even in a purely conformist society provided that there are enough high productivity individuals. The
consideration that it is likely that, at least for some agents, the level of schooling may be a way to reach
a respectable social position makes the result more robust. The model also rationalizes the fact that, as
average education grows, signals get progressively less informative. The large and growing number of new
postgraduate degrees that are activated every year provides an indirect evidence of the initial intuition.
Today a bachelor’s degree is by far a less effective signal with respect to 30 years ago and those who want
to stand out need something more.
The social welfare implications of the model are not positive. Asymmetric information about workers’
productivity and externalities stemming from interdependent social preferences suggest a tendency towards
overprovision of education. This indeed seems to be the direction towards which many developed countries
are moving.
References
[1] Akerlof, G. (1976), “The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 599-617.
[2] Akerlof, G. (1997), “Social Distance and Social Decisions”, Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 5, pp. 1005-
1027.
[3] Ashenfelter, O., C. Harmon and H. Oosterbeek (1999), “A Review of Estimates of the School-
ing/Earnings Relationship, with Tests for Publication Bias”, Labour Economics, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp.
453-470.
[4] Barro, R.J. (2001), “Human Capital and Growth”, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp.
12-17.
[5] Becker, G.S. (1993), “Human Capital”, third edition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[6] Bernheim, B.D. (1994), “A Theory of Conformity”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No.
5, pp. 841-877.
18
[7] Cho, I.-K. and D.M. Kreps (1987), “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 102, No. 2, pp.179-221.
[8] Cipollone, P. and A. Rosolia (2003), “Endogenous Social Interactions in Schooling: Evidence from an
Earthquake”, working paper, Bank of Italy.
[9] Dellas, H. and P. Sakellaris (2003), “On the Cyclicality of Schooling: Theory and Evidence”, Oxford
Economic Papers, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 148-172.
[10] Duesenberry, J.S. (1949), “Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior”, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge.
[11] Eurostat (2001), “Educational attainment levels in Europe in the 1990s — some key figures”, Statistics
in Focus, 7/2001.
[12] Eurostat (2005), “17 million tertiary students in the European Union”, Statistics in Focus, 19/2005.
[13] Falk, A. and A. Ichino (2003), “Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure”, Journal of Labor Economics
(forthcoming).
[14] Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2002), “Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish
Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 112, No. 478, pp.
C1-C33.
[15] Frank, R.H. (1985), “Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status”, Oxford
University Press, New York.
[16] Giannelli, G.C. and C. Monfardini (2003), “Joint Decisions on Household Membership and Human
Capital Accumulation of Youths - The Role of Expected Earnings and Local Markets”, Journal of
Population Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.265-285.
[17] Heckman, J., L. Lochner and C. Taber (1998), “Explaining Rising Wage Inequality: Explanations
with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings with Heterogeneous Agents”, Review
of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-58.
[18] Hopkins, E. and T. Kornienko (2004), “Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a
Game of Status”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 1085-1107.
[19] Jones, S.R.G. (1984), “The Economics of Conformism”, Basil Blackwell Publisher, Oxford.
[20] Pollak, R.A. (1976), “Interdependent Preferences”, American Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp.
309-320.
[21] Psacharopoulos, G. and H. Patrinos (2004), “Returns to Investments in Education: a Further Update”,
Education Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 111-134.
19
[22] Riley, J. (2001), “Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling”, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 432-478.
[23] Robson, A. (1992), “Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk”, Econo-
metrica, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp.837-857.
[24] Spence, M. (1973), “Job Market Signaling”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp.
355-374.
20
